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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent wave of regime change and democratization in the 
Middle East and North Africa has once again thrust transitional justice 
 
* This article was prepared for presentation at the Africa and International Law: Taking Stock and 
Moving Forward conference at the Albany Law School in April of 2012.  The author holds a J.D. 
from the University of Illinois where he graduated cum laude .  He also holds an LLM in 
International Law and Development from the University of Nottingham.  He would like to extend 
his deepest thanks to Brandon Trent, Tiffany Porter, and all the other editors for their hard work 
throughout the process without which this article would not have been possible. 
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concerns to the forefront of popular and legal interests.  As several states 
struggle to create a new future, the crimes and injustices of the past must 
first be confronted.  While the substantive goals of transitional justice 
may be comparatively easy to identify, the procedure by which these 
goals can be accomplished has been the subject of much debate, both 
recently and throughout history.1 
The difficulty of the procedural aspect stems from an important 
dichotomy.  On one hand, it is vital that the populace of the transitional 
state be fully responsible for the process.  The importance of local 
ownership or a “bottom up” approach has been addressed in great detail 
by a multitude of scholars.2  For example, Patricia Lundy and Mark 
McGovern analyze this necessity with regard to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.3  In particular, Lundy and McGovern argue that local 
participation and consultation is vital at all stages of the process, 
including “conception, design, decision making, and management.”4  It 
is not the intention of this paper to argue the importance of all of these 
elements; it is merely to determine areas where such local ownership 
may be inserted into transitional justice mechanisms. 
On the other end of the dichotomy, it is vital that any transitional 
justice mechanisms follow the internationally recognized fair trial rights 
as contemplated by various international, regional and domestic human 
rights documents.  Without such adherence, the cycle of violence is 
difficult to stem and a state risks losing the peace that transitional justice 
mechanisms are intended to secure.5 
This paper will attempt to contribute to that debate by identifying 
this fundamental tension on a hypothetical level and discussing ways in 
which it can be addressed, alongside other common problems of 
transitional justice mechanisms.  The paper is an attempt to build on the 
vital work of Lars Waldorf,6 who has examined the dichotomy with 
 
 1.  See generally NELSON MANDELA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING 
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES: COUNTRY STUDIES (1995); Paige Arthur, How 
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. R. 
QUARTERLY 329 (2009). 
 2.  See generally Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking 
Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 L. & SOC. 265 (2008); Simon Chesterman, Ownership 
in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations, 1 J. INTERVENTION 
& STATEBUILDING 3 (2007). 
 3.  Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2, at 265. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See generally Donna Pankhurst, Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political 
Emergencies: Conceptualising Reconciliation, Justice and Peace, 20 THIRD W. QUARTERLY 239 
(2010). 
 6.  See generally Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
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regard to post-genocide Rwanda by building a hypothetical framework 
for use in any future situation, as opposed to one limited to a particular 
set of events.  Such a framework will provide vital insight that can be 
drawn on to constantly improve the all-important mechanisms of 
transitional justice. 
In order to adequately examine this tension, several steps must be 
taken.  First, it is necessary to define the goals of transitional justice and 
examine historical mechanisms that have been used.  Without such a 
survey, it would be impossible to judge success and correct past failings.  
The focus of this paper will be only on prosecutions and other 
mechanisms with formality and ability to punish akin to a prosecution.  
Of the many such pseudo-prosecutions, particular focus will be paid to 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for their formality, their ability 
to grant amnesty, and the darling space they occupy in the collective 
public and scholarly imagination.7 
Second, the importance of local ownership will be discussed.  As 
previously mentioned, a great deal of work has been done on this 
particular topic.8  The discussion in this article will be limited to the 
problems associated with local ownership in transitional justice.  There 
are two extremes within this problem that will be discussed in this paper.  
The majority of the discussion will focus on the many systems that local 
populaces have considered imposed upon them by the international 
community because of a lack of decision-making and no incorporation 
of local norms.  However, there will also be a discussion of the Rwandan 
Gacaca, in which a local system was adopted nearly wholesale and has 
still encountered extraordinary problems.9 
Third, the international law of fair trials will be examined through 
international and regional human rights treaties and international case 
law.10  Various international courts have repeatedly examined the 
requirements for a fair trial.  The law will be surveyed in an attempt to 
create a rough sketch as to what constitutes a fair trial under 
international human rights law. 
Within this sketch, various areas of flexibility will be identified.  
These will be the areas in which traditional or local forms of justice can 
 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass 
Atrocity]; Lars Waldorf, A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s 
Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1221 (2010).  
 7.  Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 78 (2010). 
 8.  See generally, Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2; Chesterman, supra note 2. 
 9.  Waldrof, Mass Justice of Mass Atrocity, supra note 6, at 11. 
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 109-112. 
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be inserted without running into conflict with international human rights 
norms.  In particular, the distinction between what constitutes an 
individual right and what is a requirement of the tribunal form will be 
discussed.  This article aims to demonstrate that while international law 
mandates individual rights within a particular form, there exists some 
flexibility in rights that fall within the form of the tribunal.  This 
distinction will be addressed in great detail later in the paper. 
II. WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? 
In order to create a workable transitional justice mechanism, some 
time must first be devoted to defining transitional justice.  While many 
have attempted to define the topic, a particularly useful definition comes 
from the United Nations Working Group on Lessons Learned.11  
According to the Working Group, “Transitional justice is an approach to 
systematic or massive violations of human rights that both provides 
redress to victims and creates or enhances opportunities for the 
transformation of the political systems, conflicts, and other conditions 
that may have been at the root of the abuses.”12 
Another useful definition comes from Professor Ruti Teitel, who 
states, “transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront . . . wrongdoings.”13  Professor Teitel goes on to 
mention the imperative that there be “repressive predecessor regimes,” 
however, for the purposes of this article, that is too narrow.14 
The definitions above set forth the most important elements of 
transitional justice efforts.  First, there must have been an era where 
there were massive human rights violations.  Historically, these eras 
have taken many forms, including times of war, oppressive and despotic 
regimes, and times of massive civil upheaval.  For the purposes of this 
paper, such eras will be simply defined collectively as atrocities, as the 
non-specific nature of the article requires that it allow for flexibility as 
situations require, without presuming to know the details and exhaustive 
requirements of each individual situation. 
 
 11.   What is Transitional Justice? A Backgrounder, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 20, 2008), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_backgroun
d_note.pdf.  
 12.  Id.   
 13.  Teitel, supra note 7, at 69. 
 14.  The scope of this article includes transitional justice situations in all post-atrocity 
situations, including Professor Teitel’s “repressive predecessor regimes” along with civil wars, 
massive periods of civil insurrection such as genocide and countless other atrocities.  See id. 
4
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Among the most important elements of transitional justice, set forth 
in the first definition, is the fundamental conflict that lies at the heart of 
all transitional justice efforts.  While a primary goal is to provide some 
form of redress or justice for victims of past violence and human rights 
violations, that effort can often conflict with the competing goals of 
transforming political systems and ending conflicts that were at the root 
of the abuses.15  It is this conflict that is responsible for such tremendous 
historical difficulty in the creation of transitional justice mechanisms 
that give justice to victims of past atrocities and simultaneously allow 
for lasting peace and stability.16 
In order to reach a definition that is useful for the purposes of this 
paper, the section below will examine a number of areas of transitional 
justice.  First, the above principles of transitional justice will be broken 
down into concrete goals that have been used historically. Second, there 
will be a brief examination of historical transitional justice mechanisms 
and the problems experienced with such mechanisms.17 
A. Importance and Goals 
As is true for any form of justice, the most important step in any 
attempt to define transitional justice is to determine what the goals of 
such efforts are.  Such a determination is particularly important when 
attempting to create or upgrade mechanisms for transitional justice, as 
the outcome will be determined by the mechanisms and the mechanisms 
will be chosen based on their goals.  While mentioned briefly above, the 
broad goals of transitional justice are threefold.18  The desire of such 
efforts is to “ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation . . . .”19 
Such broad goals can be further broken down into concrete ideals.  
Transitional justice efforts have included the creation of an accurate 
historical record for society,20 the restoration of the rule of law,21 the 
 
 15.  Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. 
R. 761, 766 (2003). 
 16.  Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation: The 
Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International Criminal Justice, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 247, 247 (2010). 
 17.   Teitel, supra note 7, at 70. 
 18.  UN Secretary General, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies’, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter SG Report 2004]. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  See generally Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, Preamble 
(1995) (S.Afr.) (“To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as 
possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during 
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facilitation of reconciliation through the healing of divisions created by 
long running atrocities and many others.22  Put broadly, the goals of 
transitional justice fall under the competing values of justice and 
reconciliation.23 
The importance, then, is twofold.  First, justice must be adequately 
achieved.24  Second, transitional justice efforts must lay the groundwork 
for reconciliation from divisions fostered during periods of atrocity.25  
The fundamental conflict between on one hand punishing and on the 
other reconciling has been among transitional justice’s biggest problems.  
There are several important examples from history. 
B.  Previous Mechanisms 
The history of modern transitional justice mechanisms is 
traditionally understood as beginning with the trials that took place at the 
conclusion of World War Two.26  This includes both the Nuremberg 
Trials and the Tokyo Tribunals.27  However, transitional justice can be 
traced back nearly as far as conflict itself.  The field has been studied as 
far back as the Ancient Athenians more than four centuries before the 
Common Era.28  In that instance it was not merely historical barbarism 
where the offending parties were heinously killed or jailed, it was in fact 
a complex formula balancing retribution and forgiveness that included 
amnesties and reintegration.29 
Since that time there have been many different mechanisms used 
for transitional justice. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were 
formal international trials, organized and presided over by the Allied 
Powers.30  This type of formal, international trial scenario has been used 
repeatedly in transitional justice, including ad hoc United Nations 
 
[apartheid]”). 
 21.  See generally Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Camille Pambpell Conaway & Lisa Kays, 
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation, JUSTICE, GOVERNANCE & CIVIL SOC’Y 1, available at 
http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/49_transitional_justice.pdf. 
 22.  See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist 
Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
 23.  Posner & Vermuele, supra note 15, at 766. 
 24.  SG Report 2004, supra note 18, at 8. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Teitel, supra note 7, at 70. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Adriaa Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens: A Case Study, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
551, 551 (2010). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Belinda Cooper, Changing Hearts and Minds: The Domestic Influence of International 
Tribunals, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 548 (1999). 
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tribunals including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”), and other special courts for Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
others.31  More recently, a permanent court has been set up to adjudicate 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other acts often present in 
transitional justice scenarios.32  The International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) has recently injected itself into transitional justice by issuing 
arrest warrants for Muammar Qaddafi and other members of the late 
dictator’s inner circle during the Libyan revolution, thus renewing a 
debate as to the role the Court should play in transitional justice.33 
In the cases of ad hoc international tribunals, there has often been 
complementary adjudication through the domestic court systems of post-
atrocity states.34  In this case, complementary jurisdiction refers to the 
primacy of the domestic court system.35  In one example, 
complementary prosecutions took place initially in the wake of the 
Rwandan genocide adjudication until the lack of capacity for the 
genocide torn state made such a complementary prosecution scheme 
impossible.36 
Such domestic prosecutions do not only serve as a complement to 
international prosecutions.  They can, and have, been used along with 
many other types of transitional justice mechanisms.37  They have been 
particularly successful in complementing the so-called conditional 
amnesty, most often in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission 
(“TRC”).38  Such TRC’s allow a person to escape prosecution for crimes 
by coming forward and telling the story of said crimes.  While the first 
such TRC was created in Argentina, it is now predominantly associated 
with the transition from Apartheid in South Africa.39 
 
 31.  See generally Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to advance 
Transitional Justice: In search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2006). 
 32.  Teitel, supra note 7, at 74. 
 33.  Alison Cole, Despite Calls for local justice, Gaddafi should be tried at the ICC, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/aug/23/gaddafi-justice-
international-criminal-court.  
 34.  Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
596, 601 (2003). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEG. ST. 1, 36 
(2004) (It was estimated that due to the state of the Rwandan judicial system at the time it would 
take the formal system more than a century to judge the cases of genocidaires.). 
 37.  RULE OF LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS, OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (United Nations, New York 
& Geneva 2006). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Teitel, supra note 7, at 78.  
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One vitally important element of TRC is its limited mandate.40  
Amnesties can only be offered for crimes that fit within particular 
temporal and subject matter limitations.  For example, such limitations 
existed in post-Apartheid South Africa’s TRC, where the mandate only 
allowed for amnesties for “political crimes” and they must have taken 
place during the apartheid era.41  Without such jurisdictional limitations, 
it would be possible for ordinary criminals to take advantage of such a 
system’s existence, both destroying the public confidence and legitimacy 
and vastly decreasing the efficiency of such a system. 
The final type of transitional justice mechanism of interest here 
gained international notoriety in the wake of the Rwandan genocide.  In 
this particular occasion, a historical dispute settlement mechanism that 
had been used for settling land disputes was adapted to adjudicate the 
crimes of the genocidaires.42  While many elements of the traditional 
Gacaca would change, the main goals were the adaptation of a system 
involving community involvement that would be accessible to all.43  
While the system was not without valid criticisms that will be discussed 
in great detail below, it was an early attempt at the incorporation of 
tradition and local norms into the adjudication process.44 
III. PROBLEMS WITH PREVIOUS MECHANISMS 
The problems of previous transitional justice mechanisms can be 
grouped broadly into four categories.  By examining the various issues 
categorically as opposed to going through each mechanism individually 
and discussing its problems it will be far easier to craft a hypothetical 
framework that will avoid such pitfalls. 
There have been broad categories of complaints against previous 
mechanisms.  The first category that will be discussed is the imposed 
nature of such mechanisms.  Often the international funding and 
attention that post-atrocity states attract tends to cause the international 
community to decide the best domestic policy.45  This has created 
problems throughout the history of transitional justice.  The second issue 
 
 40.  Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 
HUM. R. Q. 597, 636-639 (1994). 
 41.  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, art. 3(3) (S.Afr.). 
 42.  Christine M. Venter, Eliminating Fear Through Recreating Community Courts in 
Rwanda: The Role of the Gacaca Courts, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 577, 578 (2007). 
 43.  Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute Resolution 
Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPPERDINE DISP. RES. L. J. 1, 34 (2012). 
 44.  Venter, supra note 42, at 578. 
 45.  Barbara Oomen, Donor Driven Justice and its Discontents, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887, 895 
(2005) [hereinafter Oomen, Donor Driven Justice]. 
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has been a lack of respect for international human rights norms and the 
international law of fair trials.46  This problem is of particular 
importance for the purpose of this article.  The third category that will be 
discussed is an all-important transitional justice failure.  While processes 
are meant to allow a state to move on and come together after atrocities, 
certain mechanisms have been accused of failing at this critical goal.47  
The fourth and final category that has been a tremendous criticism of 
transitional justice mechanisms is extraordinary inefficiency.48  This is 
mainly a procedural issue, however its significant impact on substantive 
progress and processes has led to it being a constant complaint of nearly 
every historical mechanism. 
A. Imposed Justice 
As has been mentioned previously in the article, there are varied, 
and often competing, goals of transitional justice.49  While some parties 
and mechanisms may place high value on retribution, others may focus 
on restoration.50  This particular difference is readily apparent, and 
immensely problematic, when the international community involves 
itself in post-atrocity justice, whether through financing, technical 
assistance or any other form.51 
One such prominent example is in the period of transition and 
rebuilding following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.52  In the period 
immediately following the genocide, an ashamed international 
community began entering the Central African nation in droves.53  
Barbara Oomen observes that in the period after the genocide, 
tremendous increases were seen both in internationally funded projects 
(an increase from zero to thirty-five) and in expenditures (an increase 
from $0 to over $30 million U.S.).54 
This type of international funding and interest does not come 
without political strings.  In the case of Rwanda, the international 
community saw the country as somewhat of a justice laboratory, 
 
 46.  Christopher Le Mon, Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 NO. 2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 
16 (Winter 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/2lemon.pdf?rd=1. 
 47.  See generally JON ELSTER, RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY (2006). 
 48.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 902. 
 49.  See SG Report 2004, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 895. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. 
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examining different types of transitional justice to see how well they 
could work.55  The international community also seemed to favor a TRC, 
similar to the one that was used in post-apartheid South Africa, while the 
Rwandan government had considerable suspicions of an independent 
body with the power to grant pardons to those who committed acts of 
genocide. 56 
The government ended up creating a watered-down version of the 
TRC, which would not have the power to grant pardons.57  By 
effectively hamstringing the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission, the body ended up as merely a forum for grievances that 
turned a blind eye to many of the genocide’s root causes.58  In this way, 
the Commission was an attempt to appease the international community 
by creating a body similar to the South African TRC.  However, because 
it was based on the fears and desires of domestic authorities, it removed 
one of the most important elements of such a mechanism.59  Such an 
example is telling in the relationship between the international 
community and the host country.  While Rwanda had no interest in such 
a body, international donors expected one, thus forcing the creation of a 
body that proved powerless and wasted both time and finite resources.60 
Put broadly, a major problem of international justice has been the 
differing interests and goals of the international community, which 
provides much of the funding and expertise for such justice mechanisms, 
and domestic authorities, who have differing (and often competing) 
goals.61 Predictably, this complicates the process tremendously.  While 
the international donors must be appeased in order to continue the flow 
of vital aid, both financial and technical, true reconciliation cannot occur 
without the input and decision making of local leaders and populations.  
These competing interests create an air of imposed decisions and 
imposed justice. While the full importance of local ownership will be 
discussed later, this fracture is an important criticism of historical 
transitional justice mechanisms.62 
 
 55.  Id. at 897. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 897-899. 
 58.  See generally Janine Natalya Clark, National Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda: A 
Flawed Approach?, 28 J. CONT. AFR. ST. 137 (2010). 
 59.  BARBARA OOMEN, JUSTICE MECHANISMS AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY: THE 
EXAMPLE OF RWANDA’S MULTI-LAYERED JUSTICE MECHANISMS 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Dealing_with_the_Past/Resources/
Oomen__Barbara__Rwanda.pdf [hereinafter Oomen, Justice Mechanisms]. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 897-898. 
 62.  See generally Jens Narten, Dilemmas of Promoting “Local Ownership,” in THE 
10
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B. International Human Rights 
The second criticism takes place in situations where the 
international community is less involved.  Often when post-atrocity 
states develop their own mechanisms for transitional justice, they do not 
adhere to internationally recognized fair trial norms and international 
human rights law.63  Instead, such states often devise systems that value 
efficiency, expediency, and familiarity over what would be acceptable 
under international human rights law.64  Just as above, the greatest 
example of this failure existed in the period of post-genocide transition 
in Rwanda.65 
The Rwandan transitional justice system went through many 
modifications.66  The initial plan was to prosecute those most 
responsible for the genocide in the ICTR, while the minor participants 
would be tried in Rwandan domestic courts.67  For a variety of reasons, 
this plan was doomed.  Among the primary reasons were inefficiency 
and lack of capacity, issues that will be discussed later.68  As an answer 
to this problem, the international community, along with Rwandan 
authorities, came up with the idea of the Gacaca.69  In the Gacaca 
courts, a traditional dispute settlement mechanism was adopted in an 
effort to expedite the process of genocide adjudication as well as battle 
the problem of imposed justice discussed above.70 
In the adaptation of the Gacaca for genocide adjudication, much 
was left to be desired from the standpoint of an international human 
rights lawyer.71  A few examples of the plethora of such criticisms were 
the lack of access to counsel and inability to produce evidence in 
defense, the incredibly quick speed of decision-making and the inability 
to have a fair and impartial tribunal.72  During the process it was not 
uncommon for defendants to appear alone before a Gacaca tribunal for 
mere minutes and be sentenced to long prison sentences.73  The open 
 
DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE 
OPERATIONS 252 (2009). 
 63.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.   Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.   Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 6, at 11. 
 69.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra, note 45, at 894-899. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.   Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in 
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format that was so heralded also allowed for high levels of bribery and 
intimidation of both witnesses and community judges.74 
The issues in such traditional systems historically helped bring 
about the system of international fair trial rights.  As the trial system 
grew, the formality grew along with it.  Thus, using traditional systems 
can often be problematic from a human rights standpoint unless they are 
adapted to incorporate international fair trial norms.  This incorporation 
was not done well in Rwanda, and has been a constant criticism of 
international lawyers and academics.75 
C. Failure to Move Forward 
The final substantive complaint against transitional justice 
mechanisms is that such mechanisms have not allowed for the necessary 
reconciliation.76  The widespread nature of the problem makes it 
particularly difficult to deal with.  I will use this section as an attempt to 
briefly explain why, in each particular situation, there have been 
complaints of a failure to move forward in reconciliation. 
First, in the event of formal trials, along with those trials that 
incorporate local norms, there have been constant complaints of victor’s 
justice.77  That is, there has been an invariable allegation that those who 
are punished for crimes committed are merely those that committed 
crimes on the losing side of the conflict.78  This has been particularly 
prevalent in the case of civil wars and transitions from despotic 
regimes.79  Often times the state will have problems reconciling due to 
lingering bitterness that exists among groups who feel they have been 
unjustly targeted for retribution, while those on the victorious side 
committed similar atrocities and go unpunished.80 
Post-genocide Rwanda exemplifies this difficult issue.81  During 
 
Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 147 (Spring 2008). 
 74.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 17. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  SG Report 2004, supra note 18, at Par. 8. 
 77.  See generally James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CON. RES. 140 (2003); Ralph 
Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541 (2004); 
Randall T. Coyne, Escaping Victor’s Justice by the use of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 
58 OK. L. REV. 11 (2005). 
 78.  See Coyne, supra note 78. 
 79.  David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473, 483 (1999). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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that time, genocide was primarily perpetrated by members of the Hutu 
ethnic group against the Tutsis.82  The slaughter of Tutsis was not 
stopped until current President Paul Kagame and his largely Tutsi 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) were able to capture the capital and 
stem the violence.  From that time through the present, Kagame and 
other Tutsis have dominated the Rwandan government.83  This has 
meant that in the period immediately following the genocide all the way 
through today, there have been accusations of hesitancy to investigate 
the crimes of the RPF and other Tutsis.84  Predictably, many Hutus are 
sent to jail for crimes committed that they believe were mirrored in form 
and brutality by the RPF.  This has fostered tremendous bitterness 
between the two ethnic groups and halted the country’s progress towards 
reconciliation. 85 
TRCs and other forms of amnesty can often present the exact 
opposite problem.86  A victorious side demands revenge over the 
brutalities of the cast off despot or vanquished foe. When a TRC is 
convened or an amnesty is offered, the winning side can become 
embittered and unwilling to reconcile with its former oppressors.87  
Blanket amnesties present an obvious problem in that they are simply a 
promise not to achieve retribution against those who have perpetrated 
atrocity.  TRCs, however, present a unique dichotomy that can be 
particularly difficult for victors who seek retribution and vengeance to 
tolerate.88 
It is a unique difficulty of the TRC process that the greater crimes 
one explains and admits to, the less penalties the individual will face.89  
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Rwanda Genocide: Kagame ‘cleared of Habyarimana crash’, BBC (Jan. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16472013. 
 84.  See generally Wippman, supra note 79, at 483; see also Victor Peskin, Investigating 
Rwandan Patriotic Front Atrocities and the Politics of Bearing Witness, in INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE 
COOPERATION 186 (2008).  
 85.  See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in 
Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with 
the Genocide, 45 J. AFR. L. 143 (2001). 
 86.  See generally Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in 
South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1074 (2002). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  For more information on amnesties and the issues surrounding them, see generally 
LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: BRIDGING THE 
PEACE AND JUSTICE DIVIDE (2008). 
 89.  ROSALIND SHAW, UNITED STATES INST. FOR PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE, SPECIAL REPORT 6-7 (2005), 
available at 
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For example, a person who spent his life in a government security force 
may have committed hundreds of horrific acts in defense of the regime, 
and if he is unwilling to admit to many of those acts, he may face 
punishment.  However, if he admit to all of them and gives details on 
each horrible act, he may be given amnesty.90  Thus, the greater the 
crimes admitted to, the more likely one can spend the rest of his days in 
his own home.  In the case of South Africa, this infuriated the families of 
many victims of the apartheid regime.  It has even been said that those 
who were victims of the apartheid regime were “robbed . . . of their right 
to justice.”91  This belief has fostered a similar level of bitterness in 
other post-atrocity states acquainted with the TRC.92 
The failure of reconciliation problem thus exists in both extremes.  
On one hand, when there are formal prosecutions and trials it feels as 
though only those that lost the conflict are being punished.  On the other 
hand, when no one is punished or a TRC is used, the victors often 
harvest feelings of resentment for missing their chance at retribution for 
years of oppression and brutality.  These problems have existed in 
transitional justice throughout its modern history.93 
D. Efficiency 
Finally, many transitional justice mechanisms have been woefully 
inefficient.94  While this is primarily a procedural issue, it can often have 
substantive effects.  A state that is still in the process of adjudicating an 
atrocity is forced to live under the shadow of its worst moments for 
many years after the atrocity is over.  There are a few primary reasons 
for the inefficiency within transitional justice mechanisms. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, often states undergoing a 
period of transition lack the judicial capacity for the amount of work 
necessary.95  This includes a lack of infrastructure as well as manpower.  
 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/4625/1/Rethinking%20Truth%20and%20Re
conciliation%20Commissions%20Lessons%20from%20Sierra%20Leone.pdf?1. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Apartheid enforcer sticks to ‘farcical’ story on Biko killing, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 11, 
1997), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/apartheid-enforcer-sticks-to-farcical-story-
on-biko-killing-1238495.html.  
 92.  Shaw, supra note 89, at 7. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006). 
 95.  Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo De Greiff, Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public 
Employees in Transitional Societies, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 80-120 (2007) 
(discussing various societies in post-atrocity periods of transition and the difficulties in finding 
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Often states undergoing an atrocity experience an extraordinary “brain 
drain.”96  This can happen either of two ways.  When there is a short-
term atrocity such as the Rwandan genocide, many of the professionals 
important to the transitional process either flee or are killed during the 
upheaval.97  By some estimates, immediately after the genocide, there 
remained ten lawyers in the entire country.98 
The second potential brain drain exists during a long-term 
tyrannical regime.  Often, in an attempt to solidify its hold on power, a 
regime will allow only powerful insiders to take up positions of 
importance.  This includes those in the justice department.  As a result, 
over a period of years, the only people who remain qualified to fulfill 
these important functions are powerful members of a tyrannical 
regime.99  Once that regime is deposed, no one within the country 
remains able to adequately fulfill the functions other than the members 
of the former regime, an often-unacceptable solution for those who cast 
them from power. 
This lack of capacity and “brain drain” forces the state to ask for 
the assistance of the international community.100  Once the international 
community is involved there are often many other forms of 
inefficiencies including repetition, lack of coordination, and general lack 
of expediency.101  The ICTR to date has completed only sixty-five cases 
since 1994.102  It is, however, important to note that because efficiency is 
a procedural issue with many more non-legal concerns than the 
previously discussed substantive issues, the various solutions for 
inefficiency go well beyond the purview of this paper. 
This brief synopsis of the problems associated with previous 
transitional justice mechanisms is useful in determining what must be 
avoided when crafting a mechanism that will be useful in the future.  
The populace must not be made to feel as though an outside definition of 
justice and reconciliation is being imposed on them from a faceless 
 
competent public employees). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. L. ST. 29, 34 (2004). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  For a broader discussion of the difficulties associated with the banishment of regime 
insiders from governance and the subsequent lack of qualified individuals, see generally David 
Roman, From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political Effects, 41 GOV. & 
OPPOSITION 347 (2006). 
 100.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 894-899. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Status of Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).  
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international community with no accountability.103  In an effort to ensure 
that this is not the case, many methods have been attempted.  One of the 
most discussed solutions to this problem is the inclusion of various 
forms of local ownership.  As discussed above, the possibility of using a 
traditional form from the transitioning state took hold in Rwanda.104 
The traditional form of the Gacaca is important as a remedy to two 
of the major problems discussed above.  First, adapting the traditional 
Rwandan dispute mechanism was an attempt to remedy the imposed 
nature of many transitional justice mechanisms brought about by the 
international community.105  Linked to this was the attempt to use the 
Gacaca popular participation to foster reconciliation, something that has 
been a problem in many past mechanisms.106 
However, the Rwandan Gacaca failed in several important 
international fair trial elements.107  While the Gacaca form and popular 
participation of Rwandans allowed for true local ownership and thus had 
great potential for reconciliation going forward, a trial that is 
fundamentally unfair cannot achieve justice and is thus inherently 
unacceptable.108  In order to attempt to rectify this important and 
fundamental conflict tradition and the ever-evolving international 
standards of a fair trial, we must first discuss what elements are 
necessary to make a trial “fair” by international human rights standards. 
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FAIR 
TRIAL? 
Fair trial rights are among the most important, if not the most 
important, rights in the entire body of international human rights law.  
For that reason, it is exceptionally well developed in both international 
and regional documents and case law. 
The right to a fair trial is expressly guaranteed in nearly every 
general international human rights document including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and others.109  The right is also 
 
 103.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899. 
 104.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16. 
 105.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16. 
 108.  For a general discussion of why trials must be fair, see generally Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. R. 1175 (1989). 
 109.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, Dec. 10, 1948, [hereinafter UDHR]; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, pt. 1-7, Dec. 19, 1966 [hereinafter 
ICCPR].  
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guaranteed in regional documents such as the American Convention on 
Human Rights (“ACHR”), the Banjul Charter, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).110 Fair trials are so important 
in international law that the Fourth Geneva Convention requires them 
even in times of armed conflict.111  The right is so indispensable that 
even while many other fundamental rights may be derogated from, a fair 
trial is still required by international law.112 
While there are minor differences between the fair trial rights 
promised in the various documents mentioned above, they have been 
interpreted in similar manners without much regard to the source, 
creating a relatively universal body of international fair trial law.113  
International Criminal Court Justice Stefan Trechsel notes that the 
universally recognized right to a fair trial can further be broken down 
into eight separate categories.  These categories include an independent 
and impartial tribunal, a public trial, the right to a speedy trial, the 
presumption of innocence (which includes the freedom from self 
incrimination), the right to counsel, the right to present both evidence 
and arguments in defense of the accusations and to challenge the 
prosecution’s evidence and arguments, the right to be informed of all 
charges, and finally, the right to “some form of appeal.”114 
It is the purpose of this article to discuss which of these rights 
cannot be altered in any way and which of them can be used as areas to 
insert local ownership and traditional norms while still maintaining the 
all important compliance with international human rights law.  In order 
to do this, the individual rights Justice Trechsel lists above will be split 
into two categories, those involving the form and function of the tribunal 
and those involving the treatment of the defendant.115 
The belief of this author is that local ownership and traditional 
norms can be inserted into those involving the form and function of the 
tribunal, so long as the rights involving the treatment of the defendant 
are left unaltered.  While there are a variety of reasons that individual 
fair trial rights cannot be harmed, the simple reason is that those rights 
pertaining to the treatment of the defendant are too narrow and personal, 
while those concerning the form and function of the tribunal have a 
 
 110.  African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, art. 7, June 7, 1981; American 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 
18, 1978 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 111.  Fourth Geneva Contention, art. 5, Aug 12, 1949. 
 112.  Stefan Trechsel, Why must trials be fair?, 31 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 94, 95 (1997). 
 113.  See generally Ian Langford, Fair Trial: The History of an Idea, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2009). 
 114.  Id. (note: the right to appeal will not be discussed in the framework section). 
 115.  See infra notes 143-144 and 145-149 and accompanying text. 
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much broader range that allows for both cosmopolitan and substantive 
alterations. 
A. Defendant Treatment Rights 
This fair trial sketch will begin with the defendant treatment 
category of Justice Trechsel’s fair trial rights listed above.  This category 
will include the presumption of innocence, which includes the freedom 
from self-incrimination; the right to counsel; the right of a defendant to 
present their own evidence and arguments as well as challenge those 
presented by the prosecution; and the right to be informed of all charges.  
This section will include a brief discussion of each such right and an 
explanation as to why it is not an area where local ownership and 
traditional norms can be inserted alongside the international fair trial 
right. 
The first right to be discussed is the presumption of innocence.  
Briefly, this right is codified in many international legal documents 
beginning with article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.116  In addition to merely guaranteeing that an individual remains 
innocent until proven guilty, this fair trial right grants protection against 
self-incrimination, a fundamental tenet of the presumption of innocence. 
The second right under the broad category of defendant treatment 
rights is the guarantee that the defendant be allowed to present evidence 
and arguments in his or her defense as well as challenge evidence and 
arguments presented by the prosecution.  Similar to the presumption of 
innocence, a broad range of international human rights documents 
guarantee this right. While it is not specifically mentioned by the 
UDHR, it is enumerated within article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR.117 
The defendant’s right to information is the third right included 
within this category. Similar to the right to present and refute evidence 
and arguments, this right is guaranteed by article 14(3)(a) of the 
ICCPR.118 
Of Justice Trechsel’s categories of generally accepted fair trial 
rights, the final that will be included within this category is the 
defendant’s right to counsel.  Such a right is also guaranteed by the 
ICCPR, article 14(3)(d).119  For the purposes of this fair trial framework, 
 
 116.  UDHR, supra note 110, at art. 11. 
 117.  ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(e). 
 118.  ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(a). 
 119.  ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(d). 
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there are two important inclusions in the right to a counsel.120  First, the 
defendant is given a choice of counsel according to, not only the ICCPR, 
but also the Banjul Charter, the ECHR, and the ACHR.121  Second, the 
Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the ICCPR, has determined 
that defendants should be given a choice of counsel that will act “in 
accordance with their established professional standards and judgment 
(sic) without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue 
interference . . . .”122 
The reason why these fair trial rights cannot be altered through 
local tradition is twofold.  For the first three rights discussed, the 
categorization is a matter of the broad interpretation of the right and the 
restrictiveness of the surrounding policy space.  That is, the grey area 
that exists within many of the tribunal form rights discussed below is 
simply not present. 
Simply put, an individual is either presumed innocent at all phases 
of the trial or they are not.123  If at any point that right has been altered or 
distorted, then the right has been violated and the trial has run afoul of 
the broad body of international human rights law.124  The expansive 
application of this the right to be presumed innocent right has been 
upheld repeatedly by various international courts.125  In one example, the 
ECHR held that a pre-trial public statement by a prosecutor that the 
police had found the murderer constituted an unlawful rebuke of the 
presumption of innocence.126  This level of fortitude and inflexibility has 
become commonplace.127 
The same is true for the right of the accused to present and refute 
evidence and arguments.  If the accused, within the confines of evidence 
and trial law, is not allowed to present and refute evidence and 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  ICCPR, supra note 110, 14(3)(b), Banjul Charter, supra note 111, at art. 7, ACHR, supra 
note 111, at art. 8(2)(d), ECHR, supra note 111, at art. 6(3)(c). 
 122.  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 13: 
EQUALITY BEFORE THE COURTS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND PUBLIC HEARING BY AN 
INDEPENDENT COURT ESTABLISHED BY LAW 13(9) (Apr. 13, 1984), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd?Opendo
cument.  
 123.  See generally Stefan Trechsel & Sarah Summers, The Right to be Presumed Innocent, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2006). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See generally Andrew Stumer, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: EVIDENTIAL AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE (2010). 
 126.  Paul Mahoney, Right to a Fair Trial under Article 6 E.C.H.R., 4 JUD. ST. INST. J. 107, 
121 (2004). 
 127.  Id. 
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arguments, their rights have been violated.  The same is true with the 
right to be informed of charges.  In order for these rights to be respected, 
they cannot be altered in any meaningful way. 
The fourth right, to be represented by counsel, does not share the 
same stringent application that the first three rights did.128  There are 
ways that could be envisioned where the defendant’s right to be 
represented by counsel is respected to the letter of international human 
rights law that also include local tradition or norms, however, the 
seriousness of the potential punishment for crimes in a transitional 
context requires that all potential conflicts be resolved in favor of the 
accused.129 
One hypothetical situation would be the adaptation of a traditional 
method of dispute settlement that allowed for village elders to represent 
sides.  In a transitional justice adaptation, that could include the 
assignment of village elders to defendants.  According to the letter of the 
ICCPR, that would be granting counsel to the accused.  If some choice 
were given, that could also satisfy the requirement that the defendant be 
given a choice of counsel.  However, as the Human Rights Committee 
has determined, it is not only necessary that the defendant be able to 
choose his or her own counsel, but that counsel be able to perform to 
“their established professional standards . . . .”130 
While the requirement is not, on its face, perfectly clear, it is likely 
that the Human Rights Committee would require the established 
professional standards of the Counsel to be those of the legal 
profession.131  In short, the Human Rights Committee would probably 
require the professional standards brought by Counsel be those of the 
standard profession of a counselor.132 
The Human Rights Committee has also found that the seriousness 
of the potential punishment must be taken into account when 
determining the extent of a right to counsel.  For example, in the case of 
Francisco Juan Larrañaga v. The Philippines, it was held that a 
defendant’s right to counsel was violated when his request for 
adjournment to find and hire another counsel was denied after his 
original lawyer was arrested for contempt of court.133  The Committee 
 
 128.  See supra text accompanying notes 123-127. 
 129.  Larranaga v. Philippines, Comm. 1421/2005, U.N. Doc. A/61/40, Vol. II, at 406, par. 7.6 
(HRC 2006). 
 130.  Mahoney, supra note 126, at 121. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Larrañaga, par. 2.5, 2.6. 
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noted that since Mr. Larrañaga was facing the death penalty, a 
significant amount of leeway must be afforded him, even if it causes a 
trial delay.134  In transitional justice mechanisms, the potential 
punishments are far ranging and include capital punishment, life in 
prison, and other significant periods of incarceration.135  Due to the 
seriousness of these potential punishments, the right to counsel must be 
viewed broadly in favor of the accused.136 
It can be argued that much of the development of international 
human rights law pertains to mainly formalist legal systems through 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and the ECHR.137  This is 
precisely the argument made by proponents of the Rwandan Gacaca. 
Advocates argued that because there were no prosecuting attorneys and 
the Judges did the primary questioning, along with an absence of 
complex rules of procedure that would hurt the defendant, this was 
tantamount to a fair trial.138  This view is simply unacceptable.  As 
discussed above, the Human Rights Committee and other human rights 
bodies have given significant weight to the ability of the accused to have 
legal counsel.139 
In contrast, however, it is important to note that the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, undoubtedly schooled in 
such informal tribunals, has cast a similarly broad interpretation of the 
right to counsel.  In its “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa,” the Commission states that 
accused parties have a right to legal assistance when the “interests of 
justice require” and, further, that said interests should be determined in 
criminal cases by the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the 
potential sentence.140  While complexity of the case and the ability of the 
accused to represent themselves comes into play in civil matters, it is 
irrelevant in criminal matters.141  In the Gacaca, defendants were facing 
serious charges and potential sentences that were substantial enough for 
 
 134.  Id. at 7.6. 
 135.  Sosnov, supra note 73, at 121. 
 136.  Larrañaga, par. 7.6. 
 137.  See generally John G. Merrills, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). 
 138.  L Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 
26 B.C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 385, 410 (2003). 
 139.  Larrañaga, par. 7.6. 
 140.  AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 
ON THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA H(B), available at 
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/ACHPR_Principles&Guidelines_FairTrial.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 3. 2013). 
 141.  Id. 
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the interests of justice to require the right to an attorney.142 
With these things in mind, any transitional justice mechanism that 
would be in line with international fair trial norms must leave the 
defendant treatment rights untouched.  In any such mechanism, the 
defendant must be presumed innocent at all stages of the trial, including 
the interrogation where he or she must be free from self-incrimination.  
The accused must be allowed to defend himself against all accusations 
and evidence, while being allowed to present both on his own behalf.  
The defendant must be accused of all charges against him and finally, he 
must be given access to a counsel of his choosing that is in line with the 
“established professional standards” of the legal profession.  Any 
deviation from these specific defendant treatment elements would make 
a trial in violation of international fair trial rights. 
B. Tribunal Form Rights 
The second category, and that which is considerably more relevant 
for this article, is the fair trial rights concerning the form and function of 
the tribunal.  Of the rights espoused by Justice Trechsel, this will include 
that the tribunal be both independent and impartial and that the trial be 
speedy and public.143  It is important to note that while these rights are 
not inferior to those of the defendant’s treatment listed above, they are 
considerably more flexible.144  This will allow for the insertion of local 
and traditional norms into the tribunal form.  Just as above, this section 
will include a brief explanation of each tribunal form right and an 
explanation as to why the right is flexible enough for the necessary 
inclusions. 
It is possible that there is no more important fair trial right than the 
right of the accused to an independent and impartial tribunal.145  This 
right ensures that the judiciary is not responsible to any of the other 
branches of government, so that it can make its own decisions about the 
legality of the charges against an individual, his or her guilt or innocence 
and the validity of all other aspects of the trial.146  The Human Rights 
Committee has discussed tribunal independence and impartiality with 
particular reference to the following factors: manner and qualifications 
 
 142.  Organic Law, Law No. 40 of 2000, art. 68 (Rwanda) (the Gacaca law allows for 
punishments up to and including capital punishment or life imprisonment). 
 143.  See infra text accompanying notes 147-155. 
 144.  See infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal 
Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2005). 
 146.  Id. 
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for appointment; the experience while serving as justices, including the 
term duration and their promotion; transfer and removal; and actual 
independence.147 
It is important, however, for the purposes of this article, to 
recognize that the Human Rights Committee has recognized periods 
where derogation from the strict independent and impartiality 
requirement is possible.  In the comments this refers to both military and 
“special” courts that are required by “exigencies of the actual 
situation.”148 
Similar flexibility is present in the Committee’s general thoughts on 
the publicity of trials.  While the group believes that it is “an important 
safeguard in the interest of the individual and of society at large,”149 it is 
readily acknowledged that there are situations where this right must be 
altered.  The ICCPR itself acknowledges a number of such exceptions, 
including a catch-all provision that allows the exclusion of the public 
“where publicity would prejudice the interest of justice.”150 
The final right within this category is the right to a speedy trial.  In 
the language of the ICCPR, this is the right to be tried without undue 
delay.151  Regional human rights treaties, including the Banjul Charter, 
the ECHR, and the ACHR alter the language to require that individuals 
accused of crimes be tried within a “reasonable time.”152 
In either framing, this right has been interpreted to have a dual 
requirement.  The first is that the individual not be tried so quickly as to 
restrict their ability to construct a defense.153  If an individual were 
arrested and immediately brought before a judge for trial, they would not 
have had adequate time to construct a defense, consult with an attorney, 
call and consult witnesses, or review evidence, thus rendering all of the 
other rights irrelevant.  The second prong of the speedy trial requirement 
is that the accused not be forced to wait an unreasonable time for their 
trial.154  This is the more obvious element, as an individual who has been 
 
 147.  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 122, at par. 3 
 148.  Id. at par. 4 (note: The Committee envisions such scenarios only for states of emergency 
as contemplated by article 4 of the ICCPR.  The circumstances of such a public emergency are 
unimportant for this particular article.  It is simply necessary to understand that the Committee has 
acknowledged that in extraordinary circumstances there is a small level of flexibility surrounding 
the Independent and Impartial requirement.). 
 149.  Id. at par. 5. 
 150.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 14(1). 
 151.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 14(3)(c). 
 152.  Banjul Charter, supra note 111, at art. 7(1), ECHR, supra note 111, at art. 5.3, ACHR, 
supra note 111, at art. 7.5. 
 153.  Mahoney, supra note 126, at 109.  
 154.  Id. at 119-120.  
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held for years on a charge without trial has already been punished and 
thus a verdict is immaterial.155 
The flexibility of this right is clear.  There is no hard line 
requirement in international law that a trial must occur after a certain 
number of days.  It is simply a guide; the trial must be held in a 
reasonable time.  This broad flexibility has been demonstrated in 
international holdings, with the ECHR allowing delays up to and 
including nearly thirteen years depending on the complexity of the case 
and other individual circumstances.156 
The bonding element of these three rights is the flexibility that 
international human rights law has written into their application.157  The 
same is true for the public order exception to trial publicity.  While 
declaring a public emergency may not be necessary or in the interest of 
the state, it is important that the crafters of international law understood 
the difficulties and necessities that may exist during certain periods in 
the duration of a regime.158  During post-atrocity periods, it is necessary 
that the flexibility of such rights be used in an effort to succeed in all of 
the goals of transitional justice discussed above, not merely to seek 
retribution or restitution as is so often the case for standard domestic 
criminal court systems.159 
This breakdown of fair trial rights leaves us with a delineation that 
is useful for the insertion of local norms and traditions into transitional 
justice mechanisms.  While the first category of fair trial rights, those 
that concern the treatment of the defendant at and before trial, do not 
have a grey area that can be used for procedural and substantive 
changes, the latter rights have such flexibility.  These tribunal form and 
function rights allow enough flexibility that local norms and traditions 
may be inserted in a meaningful way, giving the local populace control 
over significant procedural and substantive elements of the transition of 
their country. 
 
 155.  See generally Mahoney, supra note 126. 
 156.  Ikon Industriële konsulenten in marketing-management B.V.& Martin v. The 
Netherlands, 485 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (1992) (accepted a period of twelve years and ten months). 
 157.  It is important to note that while it is not the purpose of this article to claim that all 
transitional justice situations should be viewed in the same category as public emergencies that 
allow for derogation as envisioned by article 4 of the ICCPR and similar provisions in the ACHR 
and ECHR, it is important to the article that such provisions exist. 
 158.  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 122, at par. 4. 
 159.  Geetanjali Mukherjee, Achieving Reconciliation through Prosecution in the Courts: 
Lessons from Rwanda, 28 CONFLICT RES. QUART. 331, 334 (2011). 
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V.  LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND TRIBUNAL FORM RIGHTS 
This section of the article will serve two purposes.  First, it will act 
as an area where the tribunal form and function rights discussed above 
will be paired with hypothetical local tradition and norms.  While this 
may seem like a fool’s errand, it is important to point out specific ways 
in which traditional dispute settlement mechanisms may be incorporated 
into the hypothetical transitional justice mechanism, that both integrates 
local ownership and respects international fair trial rights.  The second 
part of this section will conclude the article in an effort to recap all of the 
crucial elements, as well as things to avoid, of a transitional justice 
mechanism that both respects international human rights norms and 
incorporates local traditions and norms.  This section will also include a 
method by which such a framework can be incorporated into individual 
transitional justice mechanisms. 
A. Hypothetical Inclusion 
This section will serve to examine the rights that were determined 
to have relative flexibility above in the context of how local traditions 
and norms may be included within their wide umbrellas. 
The requirement that tribunals be independent and impartial is 
perhaps the most important tribunal requirement of any of the fair trial 
rights.160  In spite of, or perhaps because of, its importance, it has been 
one of the most difficult requirements for judicial systems throughout 
the globe to maintain.161  Independent and impartial judiciaries have 
been of particular concern in the developing world due to, among other 
things, a lack of capacity and strength in central government.162  Post-
atrocity states implementing transitional justice schemes have many of 
the same problems.163  As discussed above, the solution to this problem 
for many transitional states has been to include high levels of 
international participation.164 
Thus, the flexibility within the right to an independent and impartial 
tribunal has a twofold importance.  First, it allows for the insertion of 
 
 160.  See generally Rep. of U.N. Con. of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 24th Sess., 
Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/REV.1 (1985). 
 161.  John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 SO. CAL. L. REV. 353, 364 (1998). 
 162.  See generally Yash Vyas, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Third World Perspective, 
11 THIRD WORLD L. ST. 127 (1992). 
 163.  Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of Problems and 
the Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 9 (2005). 
 164.  Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 897. 
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local norms and traditions.  Second, it removes some of the much-
maligned international influence that can sometimes have conflicting 
goals and creates the appearance of imposed justice. 
The flexibility of an independent and impartial tribunal does not, 
however, insinuate that a tribunal needn’t be independent and 
impartial.165  It merely means that there is some leeway in the creation 
and application of this particular right that allows for the insertion of 
local traditions and local ownership. 
Take an example of a society where community is extremely 
important to individual being and traditional dispute settlement 
mechanisms.166  Often, such community-based mechanisms have a 
strong focus on both mediation and conciliation.  For example, Fiji has a 
traditional dispute resolution mechanism that has been adapted for use in 
modern civil disagreements.  Under the mechanism, it is common for the 
offending party to apologize and be conciliatory to the offended party.  
If this apology is not accepted, the help of a third party mediator is 
sought.  This mediator must be agreeable to both parties and is 
responsible for judging the sincerity and acceptability of the apology.  If 
it is determined to be acceptable and is still not accepted by the offended 
party, that party becomes socially ostracized.  In the Fijian system, even 
merely for civil disputes, this mediation was created to foster greater 
social and communal cohesion, an important goal of transitional 
justice.167 
The difficulty in incorporating such a system into various elements 
of transitional justice mechanisms would not be high.  For instance, a 
TRC could be developed where it was the responsibility of the offending 
party to tell their story and apologize to the aggrieved parties or their 
families.  A third party mediator, who was determined to be acceptable 
by the whole of society, presumably through republican selection, could 
then be asked to determine the sincerity of the apology to determine an 
acceptable punishment.  The third party or a third party commission 
could also be asked to determine the validity of the story, using external 
 
 165.  Ferejohn, supra note 62, at 364. 
 166.  See generally Roger MacGinty, Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace, 43 
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 139 (2008) (describes the importance of reconciliation and community 
in various case studies including the Acholi in Northern Uganda, the Nasa tribe in Colombia and the 
Rwandan Gacaca courts). 
 167.  RATU FILIMONE RALOGAIVAU, UNIV. OF THE S. PAC., BLENDING TRADITIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN FIJI WITH THE RULE OF LAW—THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/BlendingTradDisputeReswithRo
L.pdf. 
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evidence, such as the case with the South African TRC.168 
This type of community-based mediation could also be used in the 
sentencing stage of a formal trial or a mechanism with like powers.  This 
has already been attempted in Australian criminal courts for indigenous 
defendants.  In a transitional justice mechanism, the defendant could be 
given the opportunity to apologize to the victim or victim’s family and 
tell his or her story.  If a third party mediator believes its sincerity, the 
sentence could be reduced or changed to something constructive for the 
community.  The goal of the Australian court system is to make for a 
more meaningful punishment, one that contributes to social cohesion and 
society in addition to retribution rather than solely retributive justice.169 
The commonality between these two examples and the South 
African TRC does illustrate a tremendous problem discussed above with 
the TRC.170  That is, the greater the evils committed and admitted to by 
the defendant, the more they have a potential for a reduced sentence.171  
The important difference is that the above examples exist in addition to 
formal trials or TRC’s, and are not sole mechanisms.  The potential for 
lesser punishment based on communal apology is an adaptation of 
traditional mechanisms that have been used to foster community and 
build society for generations.172  An individual who goes to a TRC to tell 
their story and apologize with utmost sincerity, who then is forced to 
perform services that help rebuild a post-atrocity state, is considerably 
different than one who goes to a TRC to simply tell a story and is given 
an amnesty for his or her crimes based on that story.  The apology and 
the punishment could make a considerable difference to victims and 
their advocates.173 
The same is true for the difference between the use of an apology 
and mediation in the sentencing phase of a trial.  While it may be that a 
reduced sentence is available, it would be for a traditional mediator to 
determine the sincerity of the apology and determine whether or not that 
allows them a commutation of retributive punishment into a constructive 
punishment.  Such a system has been valued in traditional societies with 
strong senses of community for many years; it is worthwhile to 
 
 168.  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, 4(f) (S.Afr.). 
 169.  Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and Justice Practices in Australia, 
in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 261-280, available at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/261-280/tandi277/view%20paper.html. 
 170.  Shaw, supra note 89, at 7. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See generally MacGinty, supra note 166. 
 173.  James Gibson, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the fairness of Amnesty in 
South Africa, 46 AM. POL. SCI. R. 540, 540 (2002). 
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incorporate such traditions into transitional justice mechanisms.174 
The question may be posed: how does this differ from a standard 
conception of the independent and impartial tribunal?  While these are 
clearly different than traditional western forms of adjudication, that does 
not mean they are different than the independent and impartial tribunal 
envisioned in international human rights law.  While the fair trial rights 
regarding defendant treatment are inviolable and unchangeable, there is 
some flexibility in rights concerning the tribunal form.175  While the 
examples above may differ from the ICTY and ICTR, set up in the wake 
of atrocities by the international community, they have many of the same 
powers but incorporate a form that has been used in community based 
societies for generations.176 
Similar flexibility is possible in the publicity and speed of trials.  
While these may seem to be minutiae in the wider array of fair trials, 
they are very important elements to consider when discussing tradition 
or local norms based dispute settlement mechanisms in transitional 
justice.177 
There are two extremely different situations where publicity may be 
of extreme concern when creating transitional justice mechanisms based 
on traditional norms and local ownership. The first is in the case of a 
TRC.178  The latter is in the event of a trial-like dispute resolution 
apparatus based on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.179 
Consider publicity in a standard form TRC.  Among the previously 
stated goals of a TRC is to create a historical record of the crimes 
committed during the atrocity period.180  While the conditional amnesty 
may serve to induce many to come forward and admit to their crimes, 
the public shaming that comes from admission of such horrific acts 
could serve to negate any such inducement.181  This would be 
particularly true when the temporal mandate of such a TRC is broad 
enough that many crimes were committed in the distant past, making 
their prosecution extremely unlikely.182  Any significant reason not to 
 
 174.  See generally RALOGAIVAU, supra note 167. 
 175.  Meron, supra note 145, at 359. 
 176.  See generally RALOGAIVAU, supra note 167. 
 177.  Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate & Steven C. Poe, Is the law a mere Parchment Barrier 
to Human Rights Abuse?, 71 J. POL. 644, 649 (2009). 
 178.  See infra text accompanying notes 180-186. 
 179.  See infra text accompanying notes 187-188. 
 180.  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, Preamble (S.Afr.). 
 181.  Elizabeth Stanley, Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 39 J. MODERN 
AFR. ST. 525, 531 (2001). 
 182.  Id. 
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come forward could be a substantial impediment to the creation of a full 
historical record. 
In such a case, it may be in the interests of justice to limit publicity 
in a manner consistent with local tradition.  In several developing states, 
including Nigeria and other African countries, there has long been a 
tradition of the administration of justice by a council of elders.183  The 
method is also quite prevalent in many Aboriginal cultures in Western 
Australia.184  In such scenarios, an aggrieving party is called before a 
council of elders who will determine his fate.185 
One potential solution to the TRC problem discussed above would 
be the creation of a section that would be responsible for dealing only 
with long past offenses in addition to a public forum for modern crimes.  
This section would not be broadcast in an effort to ensure greater 
participation, and thus a greater historical record, but to contrast the 
significant disincentives to participate such as a communal shaming and 
fears of retribution under previous TRC regimes.186 
The second problem that could be remedied by the flexibility of the 
publicity requirement is the tremendous corruption that is possible 
through communal trials.  Many traditional systems of dispute resolution 
allow for communal adjudication, in which many respected members of 
a community are asked to determine the outcome of a trial.  With 
transitional justice mechanisms, the potential for punishment is high 
enough to invite undue influence over judges by defendants and their 
supporters.  This includes vote buying and intimidation among other 
methods.187  A lack of publicity would be useful for hiding the identities 
of those asked to partake in the judgment, thus limiting the potential for 
corruption.188 
Finally is the flexibility of the speedy trial requirement.  As 
previously mentioned the right is twofold.189  Trials cannot be brought 
quickly enough to negate the defendant treatment rights above, but 
cannot be withheld for long enough that the pre-trial detention is similar 
 
 183.  Gowon Emakpe, Expert suggests way to decongest Courts, NEXT (May 10, 2011, 2:14 
AM), available at http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5698798-147/story.csp.  
 184.  Aboriginal Customary Laws, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (Oct. 
2005), available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/P94_DP.pdf.  
 185.  Id. at 85.  
 186.  Eric Brahm, Truth Commissions, BEYOND INTRACTIBILITY (June 2004), available at  
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/truth_commissions/.  
 187.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16-18 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Mahoney, supra note 126. 
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in form to retribution.190  As one advantage of the use of traditional 
justice mechanisms is efficiency, any well-designed system need not 
worry about the latter, so the only concern is the former. 
One example of the importance of this flexibility is a hypothetical 
system in which there is a singular day of adjudication; a system where 
one day per month, issues are brought before a council that will decide 
them all on that day.  Such a system could be accommodated while 
respecting international human rights, so long as that day is not near 
enough as to negate the intractable defendant treatment rights discussed 
above and fair enough away to make retribution redundant.191 
Such flexibility would be vitally important for cultures that believe 
strongly in special days for the convening of tribunals and adjudication 
of disputes.  While such an accommodation may seem trivial, in many 
societies it may not be.  In the case of Rwanda, the timing of the Gacaca 
trials was exceptionally important.  While the participation in the 
preparatory stages of the trials was exceptionally high, many of the 
tribunals themselves suffered from tremendously low participation.  This 
was due, in great part, to the timing of the trials.  The initial trials began 
during the sorghum harvest and not harvesting the grain was an 
economic impossibility for many Rwandans.192  Any system that does 
not allow for such important elements is doomed to failure. 
However, the above examples are not meant to be comprehensive.  
The hypothetical and overarching nature of this paper demands only that 
such examples be given in ways that demonstrate the flexibility of the 
tribunal form rights.  Each post-atrocity state is different and has 
different requirements and goals for transitional justice, along with 
different cultural backgrounds and traditions.  These are all important 
when incorporating traditional norms into transitional justice 
mechanisms while respecting international human rights norms. 
B.  Pitfalls to avoid 
In concluding the article, let us first briefly re-examine the major 
problems of previous transitional justice mechanisms discussed above. 
The paper identifies four broad categories of problems that have 
been prevalent in varying degrees in all of the historical transitional 
 
 190.  See generally Mahoney, supra note 126. 
 191.  Mahoney, supra note 126. 
 192.  Rwanda: Gacaca Takes Off Slowly, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14 2002, 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200210150304.html. 
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justice mechanisms.193  The first was imposed justice, or the belief of 
local populations that decisions for the state’s future are being made by 
the international community that commands the purse strings.194  The 
second was a lack of respect for internationally recognized fair trial 
rights.195  The third criticism of previous mechanisms was a failure to 
move the country forward in reconciliation.196  Finally, there has been a 
complaint of extraordinary inefficiency.197  All four of these issues must 
be dealt within an effort to create a viable transitional justice 
mechanism.198 
The first and third issues can be dealt with in kind.  In order to 
avoid the perception of imposed justice, as well as assist in the 
reconciliation of a post-atrocity state, there must be substantial 
incorporation of local traditions and norms.199  By allowing a populace 
to control its own destiny, it assists in the achievement of those goals.200  
When examining this “bottom up” approach, Lundy and McGovern 
discovered that the achievement of goals, including human rights and 
others, by outsiders can be achieved only through meaningful 
participation by the local populace.  That is, “control over decision 
making is itself central to the achievement of those rights.”201  When 
applied to reconciliation, the logic goes as follows: by allowing a 
populace to use its own system to attempt reconciliation, even if the 
mechanism developed is not the first choice of the international 
community, that system will likely be more successful because the 
control over decision making is central to the achievement of the goal of 
reconciliation.202 
Of course, local ownership is not the only necessity to avoid a 
failure to reconcile.203  Systems must also avoid the seduction of victor’s 
 
 193.  Teitel, supra note 7, at 11. 
 194.  See SG Report 2004, supra note 18. 
 195.  Oomen, Justice Mechanisms, supra note 159, at 894-899. 
 196.  See supra text accompanying note 76-85. 
 197.  Mayer-Rieckh & De Greiff, supra note 95, at 80-120. 
 198.  Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16. 
 199.  SG Report 2004, supra note 18. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2, at 281. 
 202.  TOBIAS PIETZ & LEOPOLD VON CARLOWITZ, CTR. FOR INT’L PEACE OPERATIONS, LOCAL 
OWNERSHIP IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES IN FAILED STATES: APPROACHES, EXPERIENCES, AND 
PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS 18 (2007), available at http://www.zif-
berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/Local_Ownership_ 
Workshop_Report_Dezember_07.pdf.  
 203.  Gibson, supra note 173, at 543 (discussing the complex political, social and economic 
structure that exists around post-conflict reconstruction). 
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justice.204  This has been the complaint of many systems throughout 
history.205  There is an extremely simple way to avoid this problem in 
theory, but political realities often get in the way.  It is vitally necessary 
that all potential crimes be investigated, even those committed by the 
victorious side of the conflict.  Trials for the accused must be the same 
in form and fairness, in stark contrast to the secret military trials by peers 
of the RPF in Rwanda while Hutus faced open and public Gacaca trials.  
It is not the intention of this paper to examine the potential political 
inducements or imperatives that could avoid the pitfall; it is merely a 
necessity for the success of any legal mechanism for post-atrocity 
transitional justice.206 
The use of such local traditions often brings about the second 
problem mentioned above. That is, the lack of respect for international 
fair trials norms.207  Derogation from fair trial rights would be equally 
disastrous as the two problems discussed above, for that issue, a 
framework for flexibility was drawn. 
According to Justice Trechsel, the right to a fair trial before the 
appeal can be broken down into the following: presumption of 
innocence, the right to be informed of all charges, the right to examine 
and refute witnesses and evidence, the right to counsel, an independent 
and impartial tribunal, the right to publicity of trial, and the right to a 
speedy trial.208  Among these rights, the initial four have been 
categorized as defendant treatment rights, or those rights that directly 
affect how the defendant is treated.209  These rights have been 
interpreted broadly and have such little leeway as to make the rights 
fundamentally inflexible.  There is no room within these rights to insert 
any sort of local ownership or traditional norms.210 
However, the final three rights, the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the right to a public trial, and the right to a speedy 
trial have been written and interpreted with considerable flexibility.211  
As it has been said previously, that does not imply any sort of lower 
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level of importance for these rights.212  In fact, among them may be the 
most important rights.  The flexibility simply recognizes the necessity of 
states, at certain points in their history, to make alterations to the tribunal 
form rights to account for exigencies.  There may be no greater exigency 
than post-atrocity periods of transition.213 
The final problem was procedural.214  That is, many transitional 
justice mechanisms are extraordinarily inefficient.215  An answer to this 
problem historically was the inclusion of local dispute settlement 
mechanisms that are more efficient than formalist western-style 
prosecutions such as the ICTR and ICTY.216  By increasing the speed of 
mechanisms it allows states to get out from under the shadows of 
atrocities more quickly.217  This potential is vitally important for post-
atrocity reconstruction and reconciliation. 
As this article has identified the fundamental problems experienced 
by past transitional justice mechanisms and created a framework under 
which these problems could be remedied, it is now time to discuss what 
the framework would look like for a hypothetical transitional justice 
mechanisms that avoids the pitfalls of the past while incorporating local 
norms and respects international fair trial rights.  It is important to note 
that this is a particularly daunting task and this article does not attempt 
to create anything greater than a framework from which other systems 
may draw.  Every transitional justice situation is different.  The needs of 
a particular state depend on its culture, history, particulars of the past 
atrocity, and many other elements.  The drawing of a transnational 
framework does not (and indeed cannot) attempt to encompass all 
potential societies.  It can, however, create an approach by which such 
individualized systems can be created. 
C. Steps for an Individualized Framework 
The first, and perhaps most underappreciated step that should take 
place when attempting to create a transitional justice mechanism based 
on local tradition and norms, is to determine the potential of the 
traditional mechanism for bringing about peaceful reconciliation and 
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change.  While this may seem trivial, in his study on the Rwandan 
Gacaca, Lars Waldorf points out the differences that exist in traditional 
mechanisms.  There are many variations of such systems that could be 
tremendously problematic for their adaptation into transitional justice 
mechanisms.  Many such systems have traditionally been used in an 
effort to maintain power structures.218  It is easy to see why such a 
system would be unacceptable, unless altered tremendously, for 
something as fundamentally transformative as transitional justice. 
Professor Waldorf also goes on to discuss the fact that many so-
called traditional mechanisms bear a tremendous external imprint when 
analyzed in detail.219  In this instance, perception is more important than 
reality.  While systems that receive external funding and assistance may 
bear some external imprint when studied closely, the perception and 
acceptance of local ownership is far more important.220  As it is vital that 
the adapted system appear to be local and organic, the external imprint 
must, however, be miniscule.  As long as there is a widespread 
perception that the system is traditional, the actual history is immaterial. 
The second important step is the inclusion of the local populace.221  
As discussed earlier, Lundy and McGovern discovered the importance of 
local participation with rights and mechanisms.222  Regardless of the 
form of the transitional justice mechanism, there will be no success 
without the participation of the local populace. 
While the first two steps are imperative, the word of the local 
population, through leadership or referendum, should not be viewed as 
infallible.  It is imperative that the selection of a traditional mechanism 
and the solicitation of local input do not supersede what is required 
under the internationally recognized right to a fair trial. 
This includes the fracture discussed in great detail above where the 
defendant treatment rights are left untouched and the well-selected local 
traditions and norms are inserted into the form of the tribunal.223  Under 
this system, regardless of the state, culture, area or traditions, the 
defendant is always entitled to certain things.224  The defendant is always 
given an attorney, always fully informed of the charges against them, 
always given a right to present and rebut witnesses and evidence brought 
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about by the prosecution, and finally, the defendant is always presumed 
to be innocent throughout all stages of the trial.225 
While the tribunal form rights are important, the appearance of said 
rights can be completely different depending on the incorporation of 
local traditions.226  For example, if, as was the case in Rwanda, a harvest 
is an economic necessity of the entire population, it would not be 
worthwhile to hold rounds of trials during the harvest.227  It would erode 
participation and therefore local ownership.228  The number of examples 
is unending. 
After the form of the tribunal has been determined, the most 
important element is the fundamental fairness towards all parties.229  
While victor’s justice is tempting for the long oppressed groups that 
were able to win a civil war or cast off despotic oppression, such 
temptations hamper future reconciliation.230 
This article by no means intends to over simplify or denigrate the 
process of transitional justice through various prosecution or 
prosecution-like mechanisms.  Every system is different because the 
needs of every post-atrocity state are different.  Democratization is a 
difficult and winding process.  However, if good institutions are set up 
that allow for justice and reconciliation while respecting international 
human rights norms, the process will be markedly easier for future 
transitional states. 
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